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The prime objective of the research is to explore the nexus between 
foreign aid, corruption and economic growth in ASEAN countries. 
The present research begins by providing background information 
about corruption as well as its current situation in ASEAN. 
Afterwards, the previous models used in previous research will be 
explored, followed by the discussion of data and estimation 
techniques. Moreover, the next section involves a discussion about the 
theoretical foundation of corruption models, and present estimation 
equations, data sources and mathematical derivations. In addition, the 
current study may also facilitate in spreading awareness regarding 
corruption and possible policy options for the policy makers to combat 
corruption in ASEAN. The study has employed a robust statistical 
analysis on the data covering period from 1985 to 2018. The fixed 
effect and Granger causality test are used to examine the relationship 
between foreign aid, corruption and economic growth. Finally, this 
paper aims to present a summary of the obtained empirical findings, 
policy implications, concluding remarks and future research direction. 
The study aims to particularly emphasise corruption’s indirect and 
direct effects on government expenditure, capital accumulation, 
economic growth and foreign aid.  
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Introduction 
 
Corruption is a strong constraint and a serious threat to a country’s economic development. 
Corruption tends to decline the efficiency of private and public sectors, allowing people to 
presume power not through ability rather through patronage. Those productive resources 
which generally obtain greater returns are kept idle or used for less productive businesses. 
The literature of the impact of corruption lacks empirical and theoretical support, therefore, 
current literature tries to incorporate and investigate the potential effects of corruption on the 
national output, by influencing it’s impact on economic growth and production function. Till 
now, several studies (Ali, Khan, Sohail, & Puah, 2019; Leung, 2018; Shan, Le, Chan, & Hu, 
2020; Сучок, 2016) have analysed the hypothesised impact of corruption only separately, 
however, no research examined the potential impact of corruption at the aggregate level. 
Thus, a neo-classical economic growth model was developed in this study which tried to 
capture direct and indirect corruption and human capital accumulation effects on economic 
growth (Kodongo & Ojah, 2016). This model was empirically tested by employing time 
series data for analysing the corruptive behaviour in ASEAN.  
 
During a preliminary analysis, it was found that corruption is a complex phenomenon, which 
is largely recognised as a consequence of various embedded issues arising from institutional 
incentives, governance, and policy distortion. According to the economics’ literature, 
corruption is considered as a growth inhibitive. However, a view has been put forward in 
1960 that corruption may improve the process of economic growth. For instance, Huang 
(2016) argued that political regimes and bureaucrats wish to be part of the political offices 
and they conceive politics with the same thinking and become economically inefficient. In 
another study, corruption is suggested as a modernisation consequence, asserting that 
corruption acts as a diversion from inefficient and unproductive policies. This pro-efficient 
corruption argument has been disproved by Mbaku (2019), suggesting that since bribery is 
illegal, bureaucrats try to regulate the bidding process only for the ones they trust. Trust does 
not serve as a proxy variable for efficiency; therefore, the highest bidder will not necessarily 
be the most efficient one. A similar conclusion was obtained by Lučić, Radišić, and 
Dobromirov (2016) who also suggested that corruption works under the theory of second 
best.   
 
Contrarily, the existing theoretical and empirical research (Ali et al., 2019; Leung, 2018; 
Shan et al., 2020; Сучок, 2016) has shown that the problem of corruption has considerably 
grown in the past few years. The corruption became part of the economics literature under the 
microeconomic perspective. A study Auerbach and Azariadis (2015) attempted to analyse the 
effects of rent-seeking on the economic growth and demonstrated the potential of three 
equilibria in the economy. Ogun (2018) employed a three-sector approach to develop a 
production model indicating two-stable equilibria, where the first one is established under 
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uncontrolled corruption and lack of honest agents. The other equilibrium is established when 
the economy achieves highest output without the involvement of any corrupt agents. Basu, 
Basu, and Cordella (2016) also reported two equilibria, where one is unstable and the other is 
a stable equilibrium in a corrupt economy. The researcher has fully recognised the 
importance of initial conditions and suggested that if the economy begins at average 
corruption levels then the economy will tend to move towards stable equilibrium with even 
higher levels of corruption, whereas, if there is low average levels of corruption, then it will 
return back to its honest economy. Thus, Leff’s analysis only holds considering the 
perspective of Hall, Levendis, and Scarcioffolo (2019) who stated that corruption is a 
consequence of inefficient public policy. If the government’s main priority is to achieve high 
levels of economic development then there will be uncontrolled corruption, and vice versa.  
 
Figure 1. Corruption perception Index ASEAN ( 0 : least corrupt ) 
 
 
The tax and tariff context was also considered, to analyse the trends of corruption. Aidt 
(2016) suggested that rent seeking is particularly more costly as compared to the tariff. The 
findings of this study suggest that for a given level of import restriction, the rent-seekers have 
a Pareto-inferior competition against a tariff-equivalent restriction. The findings obtained by 
Aidt (2016) are consistent with the findings of Hall et al. (2019) study, which have found that 
there is a difference between taxes and bribes, where bribing is an illegal act. However, this 
rent-seeking model by Aidt (2016) can only be applicable for the case of developing 
economies, with income inequality prevailing among non-government and government 
workers. Besides corruption as one type of rent-seeking, various other forms of corruption 
also exist. Bertrand, Betschinger, and Laamanen (2019) also tried to analyse corruption 
within different firms’ contexts; for this purpose the study used the principal-agent model to 
assess the corruption’s impact on development. Another noticeable fact is that majority of 
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microeconomic models use the corruption variable for predicting the economic development. 
However, these microeconomic models only consider corruption’s effects without 
considering its larger aggregate effects on output (Iamsiraroj & Ulubaşoğlu, 2015). Thus, 
ignoring such potential effects may infuse priori bias in the model. Therefore, such 
microeconomic models could not quantify the trade-off among indirect and direct effects to 
prevent corruption. 
 
Literature Review  
 
The literature of economics is full of microeconomic and principal-agent models, but there is 
no such richness in macroeconomic literature. To examine the effects of corruption on the 
macroeconomic variables of the economy, various economic growth models were being 
employed in previous research (Ali et al., 2019; Leung, 2018; Shan et al., 2020; Сучок, 
2016). The author also stated that corruption acts as an obstacle in achieving economic 
growth and also diminishes the effectiveness of investment. Another study has reported that 
corruption minimises the level of human capital and the share of investment. In addition, a 
significant negative impact of corruption on the level of investment and insignificant impact 
on growth has been reported, with the Luas growth model (Crescenzi, Cataldo, & Rodríguez‐
Pose, 2016). On the contrary, it has been argued that the intention of gaining corruption 
benefits can easily restrict the access to key social services. Therefore, the study concluded 
that corruption poses negative impacts on human development. Furthermore, the government 
officials feel enticed by corruption and tend to allocate less public resources to social welfare 
to gain extorting bribe opportunities. Agostino, Dunne, and Pieroni (2016) suggested the 
potential effects of corruption and mentioned that it lowers the quality of public services and 
infrastructure projects, resulting in the reduction in investment, economic growth and 
negative effects on human development.  
 
Mazllami (2019) designed and demonstrated a Keynesian model to exhibit the negative 
effects of corruption on the production, employment level, consumption, government 
spending, money market, domestic investment and net exports of a developing country. 
Another study revealed a negative relation among corruption and a balanced growth path, by 
employing an endogenous growth model (Ugwuanyi & Ugwunta, 2017). In a balanced 
growth model, the level of growth declines with an increase in bribe payments. Therefore, it 
is presumed that the magnitude of investment reduces with the increase in corruption, 
resulting in the reduction of economic growth level (Haque & Kneller, 2015). Contrarily, 
while considering an infinite horizon growth model, the researcher presumed that 
entrepreneurs tend to put in more human capital resources and time to deal with bureaucratic 
obstacles, particularly in the presence of bureaucracy. As the longer it takes to deal with 
bureaucracy issues, the greater will be the bribe payments. In the view of the scholar, 
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requiring more time to handle government officials tends to increase the demand for higher 
bribe payments, thereby wasting potential human capital and time. 
 
According to Agostino et al. (2016), corruption alters the government spending composition, 
discourages investment, and restricts the level of economic growth. He attempted to analyse 
corruption’s effects on various public spending, and incorporated ethno-linguistic 
fractionalisation as an instrument variable (Cooray, Dzhumashev, & Schneider, 2017). A 
two-stage least square method was used in this study and the findings suggest that corruption 
reduces economic growth level by reducing the rate of investment. Although, Bertrand et al. 
(2019) suggested that those bureaucrats which are involved in corruption try to make 
investment in larger projects making bribery less easily identifiable. The empirical findings 
of Mauro has directed the attention towards another controversial topic. However, Mauro’s 
work also has several shortcomings. On the other hand, Van den Berg (2016) used a 
neoclassical growth model and added corruption, assuming that economic growth is 
negatively affected by corruption. Their model suggests that government officials can decide 
whether they want to take bribe or not. However, the study used similar methodology as used 
for criminal activities in previous studies. However, the assumptions have failed to satisfy 
two points: 
 
Firstly, Goedhuys, Mohnen, and Taha (2016) advocated corruption as a persistent 
phenomenon and the decision of whether to engage or not in corrupt activities does not solely 
depend on the chances of being caught. On the other hand, there is a second group which 
prevents individual behaviour. This suggests that the predecessor’s reputation directly 
influenced the individual’s behaviour of becoming corrupt or not. Although, all the 
aforementioned models must also consider the potential endogeneity bias. However, the 
endogeneity bias usually arises when the results of subjective surveys are used as a proxy 
variable for the level of corruption and which can be avoided by employing appropriate 
estimation techniques (Kim & Kang, 2014). The results obtained from these may seem to be 
less powerful because of higher sensitivity towards the corruption index and sample size 
employed in the data. This approach also offers some important implications that can be 
considered while conducting future studies by using those models which are less sensitive in 
terms of indexes, sample size and proxies. Furthermore, the aforementioned models 
separately test the effects of corruption, without considering its aggregate impact on 
production factors and on the long term growth implications (Webb & Martin, 2017). Thus, 
there is still no theoretical framework available in the existing literature which examines the 
corruption’s potential effects on output by influencing the production function, economic 
growth and development. Therefore, a neoclassical economic growth model is developed in 
this study involving human capital accumulation and indirect and direct effects on economic 
growth by corruption. While developing a theoretical model for economic growth, the study 
also takes into account the possibility of economic growth in ASEAN to be influenced by 
    International Journal of Innovation, Creativity and Change.  www.ijicc.net  
Volume 11, Issue 2, 2020 
 
 
 
 
 
68 
corruption through affecting foreign aid, investment, and government spending (Hakimi & 
Hamdi, 2017).  
 
The Theoretical Model  
 
For developing a theoretical model, the present study used Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) 
work. The findings suggest that adding human capital into the production function has 
significantly improved the explanatory power of the Solow growth model. This paper is the 
extension of the Solow model, aiming to incorporate corruption as a government spending 
determinant. Hence, this study defines corruption as ‘using public office power to obtain 
private benefits’. In order to clarify, we assume that the economy under study is a good 
producing economy, where output is produced by incorporating well-behaved production 
function having strict and positive physical capital with diminishing marginal productivity 
(Matar, 2016). The Inada conditions assume that for both labour and capital, the marginal 
productivity will reach to infinity when its value reaches to zero, and when the value reaches 
to infinity, the marginal productivity will be equal to zero. Thus, the functional form of Cobb-
Douglas production function is as follows: 
 
𝒀𝒀𝒕𝒕 = 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽[𝐺𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡(𝜃𝜃)𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡] … … … . (1) 
 
Here Yt represents an aggregate of real income level, 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼 represents the physical capital, 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡
𝛽𝛽represents the human capital level, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 represents the total number of labour employed, 
Gt represents government spending, and ρ shows a country’s level of corruption, where 
𝐺𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡(𝜃𝜃) < .  Suppose that 0 < α <1, 0 < β <1 and α + β <1. Such conditions confirm that for 
each point, the production function displays constant or diminishing returns to scale. Time (t) 
is taken as a continuous variable. By omitting corruption, the standard neo-classical results 
will be obtained, i.e. for each worker, growth rate increases by increasing the physical capital 
investments and decreasing capital depreciation rate, decreasing output per worker at initial 
level and the population growth. Thus, the equations are stated as follows: 
𝒅𝒅𝒅𝒅𝒅𝒅
𝒅𝒅𝒕𝒕
= 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 − 𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡………….. (2) 
 
𝒅𝒅𝒅𝒅𝒅𝒅
𝒅𝒅𝒕𝒕
= 𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 − 𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡………….. (3) 
 
Here, 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃, 𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃,𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃   and 𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃shows the parameters for this model, representing income shares 
for capital and human investment, and physical and human capital’s depreciation rate. 
Moreover, population growth is taken to be constant over time, which is defined and 
determined exogenously 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 = 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿0𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡. Whereas, the full employment assumption 
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suggests that ‘n’ also specifies the labour force growth rate(
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑑𝑑
= 𝑛𝑛). Thus, the steady state 
reduced equation is stated as follows:  
 
𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥 �
𝒀𝒀𝒕𝒕
𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝒕𝒕
� = ln(𝐺𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑣𝑣0) + ∅𝑡𝑡 + [𝛼𝛼/(1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)]ln [ 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑛𝑛+𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃+∅)] + [𝛽𝛽/(1 − 𝛼𝛼 −
𝛽𝛽]ln [ 𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃(𝑛𝑛+𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃+∅)]…… (4) 
 
In the equation (4), it is revealed that this reduced equation for a steady state is an increasing 
function of human and physical capital savings, growth rate of initial government spending 
level, and government spending at output per worker. The output growth per worker can be 
expressed through making differentiation in terms of time, to obtain a steady state level: 
 
𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝒀𝒀𝒕𝒕 − 𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝒀𝒀𝟎𝟎 = (1 − 𝑒𝑒𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡){ln(𝐺𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑣𝑣0) ln(𝐺𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑣𝑣0) + ∅𝑡𝑡 − [ 𝛼𝛼+𝛽𝛽1−𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽](ln [𝑛𝑛 + 𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + ∅] +[ 𝛼𝛼
1−𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽
] ln(𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃) + 𝐺𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡(𝜃𝜃)} − (1 − 𝑒𝑒𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡)𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝒀𝒀𝟎𝟎…… (5) 
 
The change in the effectiveness of government spending gives an inverse relationship of 
upward moving corruption with output growth per worker, although, standard neoclassical 
results are obtained by omitting the corruption term (see equation 5). This implies that output 
growth rate per worker increases by increasing the human and physical capital investments 
and decreasing the depreciation rate of capital, population growth and output per worker at 
the initial level. In an attempt of modelling corruption effects on the multifactor productivity, 
the present study assumed a structural form for that factor. The corruption has a non-linear 
effect on the economy and is bounded by a subsistent level and corrupt-free output. In an 
economy, all government agents will not depart from the production sector, therefore, some 
output is expected to be generated. Thus, to assess the relation of corruption in government 
spending function, we suppose that: 
 
𝐺𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡(𝜃𝜃) = 𝐺𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾� ……………………………………. (6) 
 
Where 0 ≤ 𝜃𝜃 ≤ 1, and 
 
𝐺𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡�=𝐺𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒∅𝑡𝑡……………….. (7) 
 
𝜃𝜃 is the parameter which shows the corruption index to be used and γ represents the 
magnitude of corruption effects on government spending. The traditional government 
spending expands at the rate ‘∅’ and is exogenous. Therefore, Equation (6) explains the state 
when there is no corruption in the economy. It also holds for 𝐺𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡�=𝐺𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡. Corruption 
influences every production function in a different way; the effects of corruption increases 
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when γ exhibits a higher value. Ceteris paribus, when γ=0, the corruption function equals the 
point of unity and maximises total output. Thus, the equations 1, 2, 3 can also be stated in an 
intensive form: 
 
?̈?𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 𝑒𝑒−∅𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼̈ 𝐻𝐻?̈?𝑃𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽…… (8) 
 
𝒅𝒅𝒅𝒅?̈?𝒅
𝒅𝒅𝒕𝒕
= 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃?̈?𝑦𝑡𝑡 − (𝑛𝑛 + 𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + ∅)𝑃𝑃?̈?𝑃𝑡𝑡………….. (9) 
 
𝒅𝒅𝒅𝒅?̈?𝒅
𝒅𝒅𝒕𝒕
= 𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃?̈?𝑦𝑡𝑡 − (𝑛𝑛 + 𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + ∅)𝐻𝐻?̈?𝑃𝑡𝑡………….. (10) 
 
Here, ?̈?𝑦𝑡𝑡=Y/L, 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼̈ =PK/Lab, 𝐻𝐻?̈?𝑃𝑡𝑡
𝛽𝛽=HK/Lab, ?̈?𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 𝑦𝑦/𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡𝐺𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡  represents each worker’s 
output per government spending, 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼̈ =PK/𝐺𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡 shows human capital for each worker per 
government spending and 𝐻𝐻?̈?𝑃𝑡𝑡
𝛽𝛽=HK/𝐺𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡 shows physical capital per worker per government 
spending. Thus, at the steady state, equation 9 and equation 10 equals to 0. Setting these 
equations to zero offers a three equation system with three unknowns. Thus, following are the 
state levels of human and physical capital: 
 
𝑃𝑃?̈?𝑃𝑡𝑡 = �� 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑛𝑛+𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃+∅)�� 1−𝛽𝛽1−𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽�� ∗ �� 𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃(𝑛𝑛+𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃+∅)�� 𝛽𝛽1−𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽�� ∗ 𝑒𝑒−∅𝑡𝑡 …….. (11)   
 
𝑃𝑃?̈?𝑃𝑡𝑡 = �� 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑛𝑛+𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃+∅)�� 𝛼𝛼1−𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽�� ∗ �� 𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃(𝑛𝑛+𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃+∅)�� 1−𝛼𝛼1−𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽�� ∗ 𝑒𝑒−∅𝑡𝑡……. (12) 
 
Replacing Equations 11 and 12 to the equation 8 results, we obtain: 
 
?̈?𝑦𝑡𝑡 = �� 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑛𝑛+𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃+∅)�� 𝛼𝛼1−𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽�� ∗ �� 𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃(𝑛𝑛+𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃+∅)�� 𝛽𝛽1−𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽�� ∗ 𝑒𝑒−∅𝑡𝑡 ……. (13) 
 
Since y ?̈?𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡/(?̈?𝐺𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡) Thus, substituting it into the obtained (13), and then multiplying it 
with ?̈?𝐺𝑡𝑡, followed by taking the natural log, we obtain: 
 
𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥 �
𝒀𝒀𝒕𝒕
𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝒕𝒕
� = ln(𝐺𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑣𝑣0) + ∅𝑡𝑡 + [𝛼𝛼/(1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)]ln [ 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑛𝑛+𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃+∅)] + [ 𝛽𝛽1−𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽]ln [ 𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃(𝑛𝑛+𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃+∅)] − ∅𝑡𝑡 
…… (14) 
 
In order to clarify, assume that the depreciation rate for physical and human capital is the 
same. Therefore, we obtain: 
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𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥 �
𝒀𝒀𝒕𝒕
𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝒕𝒕
� = ln(𝐺𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑣𝑣0) + ∅𝑡𝑡 − [𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽/(1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)]ln [𝑛𝑛 + 𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + ∅] + [ 1−𝛼𝛼1−𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽]ln [𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃] +[ 𝛽𝛽
1−𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽
]ln [𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃] − ∅𝑡𝑡 …… (15) 
 
Now, the equation (15) explains that the output per worker in a steady state is increasing at an 
initial multifactor productivity level, capital and physical rates of investment and growth rate 
Bonga, Sithole, and Shenje (2015) of initial multifactor productivity. For each worker, the 
steady state output increases with higher multifactor productivity levels, and the greater the 
multifactor growth rate the higher will be the steady output per worker. The investment rate 
automatically works through Equations (11) and (12). Obtaining higher rates of investment 
tends to increase per worker’s human and physical capital, which in turn increases the level 
of output for each worker, using equation (8). However, output per worker may decrease by 
depreciation [𝑛𝑛 + 𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + ∅] in capital and corruption. The value for γ determines the effects 
of corruption. If the value for γ is positive, it indicates that corruption is weakening the level 
of output, while, if the value for γ is negative, it indicates that corruption is enhancing the 
output and if γ=0, then the equation for a steady state output level equals to MRW. It shows 
the corruption effects on the economic growth and steady state level of a country. Capital 
productivity reduces with the increase in corruption by shifting the production function to 
right (Borja, 2017). Thus, at point A, it is impossible to maintain the initial capital stock per 
worker (k0), and moving the economy towards lower per capita stock per worker (k1). Thus, 
moving from k0-k1, negative economic growth will be witnessed along with reduction in 
output per worker.  
 
Convergence to a Steady State  
 
Keeping with MRW, the speed of convergence can be derived by reaching closer to the 
steady output level. We represented the speed of convergence using first order linear 
differential equation: 
 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
= 𝜗𝜗(𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 − 𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡) … … (16) 
 
Here, 𝜗𝜗 = [𝑛𝑛 + 𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + ∅] ∗ 1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽, This can be rewritten as e−𝜗𝜗𝑡𝑡 �dytdt � +  𝜗𝜗𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 =e−𝜗𝜗𝑡𝑡(lnyss)to get the solution for Equation 16, thus we obtain: 
 
𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = (1 − e−𝜗𝜗𝑡𝑡)(lnyss) − (1 − e−𝜗𝜗𝑡𝑡)lny0….. (17) 
 
Here, y0 shows the economy’s output at initial level. The right and left sides of Equation (17) 
is subtracted by ln yss with (15), we obtain the convergence equation: 
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𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝒀𝒀𝒕𝒕 − 𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝒕𝒕= (1 − e−𝜗𝜗𝑡𝑡) ∗  {ln(𝐺𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑣𝑣0) + ∅𝑡𝑡
− �
𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)] (ln[𝑛𝑛 + 𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + ∅]) + � 1 − 𝛼𝛼1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽� ln[𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃] + � 𝛽𝛽1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽� ln[𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃]
− ∅𝛾𝛾� − (1 − e−𝜗𝜗𝑡𝑡)lny0 … . . (18) 
 
Given a constant speed of convergence (𝜗𝜗), equation (18) is an economic growth function of 
initial multifactor productivity level and its growth rate, human and physical capital 
investment rates, population growth rate, initial output level and corruption level. Previously, 
the trivial factors indicate positive associations among initial levels of technology and time 
trends. Furthermore, this model also presents the traditional Solow neoclassical results. 
Exogenous parameters, e.g. depreciation rate and population growth, cause negative effects 
on the economy. However, the conditional convergence for this model is determined through 
the negative association among the economic growth level and initial output level.  
 
Corruption minimises human and physical capital effectiveness which in turn affects the level 
of output per worker. Moreover, lower output per worker involves lower investments, 
therefore, keeping investment rates fixed. This would give rise to lower investment levels 
which further brings reduction in the level of output. Thus, it will result in negative impact on 
the rate of output growth per worker. Considering equation (15), it is the positive or negative 
sign of gamma which determines the direction of corruption, i.e. whether it is output 
debilitating or output enhancing. If the value of gamma is positive then it indicates that 
multifactor productivity has negative effects, on the other hand, if the value of gamma is 
negative, then it indicates results that are output-enhancing. To maintain uniformity, it must 
be noted that if gamma is zero then the equation (18) is reduced to the MRW. Equations (15) 
and (18) inherently contribute in a way that these equations can be tested directly by using 
ordinary least square (OLS). Therefore, the study must assume assumptions such as normality 
and other about the data.   
 
Model Extensions 
  
The above model is formulated to analyse the corruption effects on the economic growth 
through integrating a multifactor productivity and corruption in a Cobb-Douglas production 
function. This model will help to assess the government officials’ corruptive behaviour in 
government resource allocation. Although, these government officials may have no control 
on the government spending, but they try to obstruct the resource allocation process, which 
comes from external sources like the United Nations, World Bank, and International 
Monetary Fund, non-government organisations, and foreign governments. Therefore, 
modification can be made in the above-mentioned model to analyse the slowing down of 
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economic growth through the corruption level, which occurs by affecting the level of foreign 
aid and government spending. Thus, we can reproduce equation (1) as: 
 
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 = 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽[𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡(𝜃𝜃)𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡]1−𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽…… (19) 
 
Reconsidering and replacing G (government spending) in the equation (6) with F (foreign 
aid), we obtain: 
 
𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡(𝜃𝜃) = 𝐹𝐹?̈?𝑡𝑒𝑒−𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝜗𝜗……………………. (20) 
 
Here, γf represents the magnitude of the corruption’s effect on the foreign aid. Thus, 
assuming conventional foreign aid (Ft) to be exogenous, it grows with rate 𝐹𝐹?̈?𝑡𝑒𝑒−𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝜗𝜗keeping 
dFt =0. Thus, the data for the foreign aid will be used to estimate the following equation, by 
employing the same mathematical arrangement as used in the developing equation (15).  
 
𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥 �
𝒀𝒀𝒕𝒕
𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝒕𝒕
� = ln(𝐹𝐹0) + 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 − [𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽/(1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)]ln [𝑛𝑛 + 𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + ∅] + [ 1−𝛼𝛼1−𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽]ln [𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃] +[ 𝛽𝛽
1−𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽
]ln [𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃] − 𝛾𝛾𝑓𝑓𝜗𝜗…… (21) 
 
Data and Estimation  
 
To perform a thorough statistical analysis, obtaining quality data is a prerequisite for a broad 
sample, such as in the case of emerging markets. The theoretical models involve certain 
parameters for physical capital investment rate, corruption, human capital saving rate, 
depreciation rate, multifactor productivity (such as, foreign aid, government spending) and 
population growth. Several sources were used for these variables. The economic data was 
obtained primarily from IMF, World Penn Tables, World Bank, Lebanese Ministry of 
Finance, and Bank of ASEAN. Whereas, for the corruption index, several information 
sources were used having merits and demerits for each one. Since there is no perfect 
corruption index, the one with longest time series was chosen for ASEAN. This corruption 
index is obtained from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) of Political Risk Services 
International. The ICRR index involves enough information, as compared to the ones of their 
competitors, based on its correlation along with other corruption indices (Knack, 2001). Thus, 
the current data base was extensively utilised to carry out corruption related research, as 
appeared in the recent works (Tanzi & Davoodi, 2000; Knack & Keefer, 1995; Everhart & 
Sumlinski, 2001; Rajkumar & Swaroop, 2002; Abdiweli & Hodan, 2003; Seldadyo & Haan, 
2006). As with other corruption indices, ICRG also suffers from expert’s biasness risk i.e. 
biased opinions of experts. ICRG tries to determine the level of corruption through analysing 
special payments that the government officials demand and whether such payments are also 
demanded by lower level government officials. Such payments are generally made as bribes 
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and are associated with exchange controls, police protection, import-export licenses, loan, or 
tax assessment. A numeric measure is provided by ICRG which ranges from 0-6, where 0 
represents most corrupt and vice versa. This data base issue ratings every month for more 
than 100 countries, starting from 1984. In Equation (1) the corruption index was represented 
by ρ. Thus, the raw data for corruption (ςt) will be converted into an index having a range 
between 0-1, i.e. the closer the value to 1 the higher will be the average level of corruption. 
This function is used because CRPT ()ςt turns output into a negative corruption function. For 
testing corruption’s linearity, the corruption function would then be added both non-linearly 
and linearly into the production function. Accepting various limitations of corruption 
measures is often difficult. The operational definition presented in this study for corruption 
states that corruption is ‘using public official power to obtain private benefits’. It is evident 
that varying degrees of abuse are available and separating low-cost and annoying corruption 
from the Mobutu-style or grand corruption is clearly not possible. Even if it is possible to 
measure the corruption’s immediate impact, how can we still capture its subsequent impact, 
since investors often tend to avoid situations of out of control corruption?  
 
The base model of the study without corruption used to estimate the impact of human and 
physical capital by static panel is as follows :  
 
𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝐺𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼2(𝛿𝛿 + 𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) + 𝛼𝛼3𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼4𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 … … . (22) 
 
Adding the element of corruption in equation 22  
 
𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝐺𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼2(𝛿𝛿 + 𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) + 𝛼𝛼3𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼4𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼5𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 … … . (23) 
 
Adding the element of foreign aid in equation 23  
 
𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝐺𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼2(𝛿𝛿 + 𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) + 𝛼𝛼3𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑣𝑣 − 𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼4𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼5𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+ 𝛼𝛼6𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 … … . (24) 
 
Thus, this model has following limitations: 
 
1) It only takes into account the government corruption;  
2) The corruption index (ICRG) employed in this study is a poll of polls which is presumed 
to assist in cleansing surveyor-specific bias involved in the analysis. ICRG like other 
corruption indices tries to capture the perceptions of business people, risk analysts and 
academics about the degree of corruption. One of the major drawbacks of using this 
database is that it involves a short time series, is developed on the basis of subjective 
surveys and does not involve any methodology changing trouble from time to time.  
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The data inconsistency with respect to time gives rise to another unknown bias. Thus, in 
order to appropriately utilise and affect the shape of this database, it is important to 
acknowledge the limitations of corruption data. Some basic qualities also exist which make 
the corruption indicator most useful. Generally, for good measure, it must be trustworthy to 
capture the level of corruption. The credibility of an indicator declines when it is developed 
on the basis of one or few person’s personal opinions, and thus becomes less useful. In 
addition, there must also be a valid measurement. Such as, if one aims to only capture the 
studying aspects of corruption, then measuring corruption convictions may only reflect the 
judiciary institutions’ effectiveness. Other key factors include precision and accuracy. The 
greater susceptibility of the index to make measurement errors turns it into a less useful 
index. However, a standard deviation must be used to assess the level of accuracy. Contrarily, 
a quantity exhibits precision when there is general agreement on what it measures, whereas, it 
is ambiguous or imprecise when different opinions exist regarding a particular number. 
Survey precision can be achieved by inquiring those questions which are unrelated to 
individual standards. Moreover, government spending is used as a multifactor productivity 
measure in this model, without considering other factors, such as technology’s impact on the 
growth (Sakamoto, 2018).   
 
The estimation of the regression pair is entailed by Granger causality test. 
 
𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕 = ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 +𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡=1 𝜀𝜀1𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡…………... (25) 
𝑹𝑹𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕 = ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝐺𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 +𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡=1 𝜀𝜀2𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡…………….. (26) 
𝒅𝒅𝑮𝑮𝑷𝑷𝑹𝑹𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕 = ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 +𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡=1 𝜀𝜀3𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡…………. (27) 
𝑬𝑬𝒅𝒅𝑬𝑬𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕 = ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 +𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡=1 𝜀𝜀4𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡……………. (28) 
𝑪𝑪𝑮𝑮𝑪𝑪𝑬𝑬𝑷𝑷𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕 = ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 +𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡=1 𝜀𝜀5𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡………. (29) 
𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕 = ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 +𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡=1 𝜀𝜀6𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡……….… (30) 
𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑮𝑮𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕 = ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 +𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡=1 𝜀𝜀6𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡…………….. (31) 
 
Results  
 
Correlation analysis is used to determine the direction and strength of the relationship 
between latent variables. As illustrated in Table 1, the results show that all variables, have a 
positive relationship with ECN.  
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Table 1: Correlation Analysis  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
RGDP 1.00       
 --       
Gov 0.15 1.00      
 (0.41)                  --      
Pop 0.20 0.13 1.00     
 (0.27) (0.48) --     
Inv 0.26 -0.13 0.41 1.00    
 (0.15) (0.46) (0.02) --    
Edu 0.03 -0.12 0.43 0.03 1.00   
 (0.87) (0.52) (0.01) (0.88) --   
Corup 0.311 0.03 -0.23 0.31 0.13 1.00  
 (0.01) (0.87) (0.52) (0.01) (0.88) --  
Faid 0.411 0.543 -0.762 0.052 0.362 0.234 1.00 
 (0.01) (0.627) (0.52) (0.01) (0.88) (0.62) -- 
 
Econometric theory requires that all variables must be stationary conditions. If non-stationary 
variables are used in the regression, the results will be misleading because of spurious 
regression. Therefore, it is a preliminary condition to test for the unit root before proceeding 
to other econometric analysis. In this study, the LLC test was employed to perform the panel 
unit root test. 
 
Table 2: LLC test  
Test Constant Constant+Trend 
Panel v-Statistics -1.926 -2.8731 
Panel 𝜌𝜌 -Statistics 0.07231 0.7632 
Panel 𝑡𝑡 -Statistics (non-parametric) -6.6752*** -8.843*** 
Panel 𝑡𝑡 -Statistics (parametric) -4.327*** -6.674*** 
Group 𝜌𝜌 -Statistics 2.732 2.923 
Group 𝑡𝑡 -Statistics (non-parametric) -7.762*** -10.253*** 
Group 𝑡𝑡 -Statistics (parametric) -3.877*** -4.324*** 
 
The null hypothesis is rejected at 5 percent significance level by the ADF, and in the panel 
and group t statistics, even the conditions are constant or constant plus trend. Therefore, the 
null hypothesis rejection is supported by most of the statistics, which reflects that there exists 
a long-term association between the variables with reference to the ASEAN countries. In the 
conditions of constant or constant plus trend, the parametric (ADF-statistics) and non-
parametric (t-statistics) are considered reliable (Pedroni, 1999). In this regard,  Table 3 shows 
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the results, which lead to the conclusion that there is a long term association between the 
variables. 
 
During the estimation exercise, we conducted a number of tests that included the Redundant 
Fixed Effects test and Hausman test. For instance, the Redundant Fixed Effects test was 
conducted to test the hypothesis that time-specific effects are present in the time series and 
cross section data. This test enables us to determine if the pooled Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) estimation is appropriate or not and whether one should use the FE/RE estimation. 
Similarly, the Hausman test was performed to determine if the RE estimates are correct and 
preferred to the FE and GMM estimates. The data of ASEAN countries over the period of 32 
years from 1982 to 2017 is gathered from the official forums The fixed effect regression 
results of the model 2-8 are explained in the table 2 and table 3. The findings of the study are 
showing consistency with the prior finds. The government expenses and inflation appeared  
in a negative but significant relationship with the saving of ASEAN countries.  
 
Table 3: Regression results of fixed effect estimates (equation 22-24) 
 
Table 4 represents the results of causality direction between the variables of interest 
examined through Granger causality test. This study performed the Granger causality test to 
assess the causal relation between economic growth and corruption. For this test, same data 
set for real per capita GDP and corruption was used and was obtained from IMF and ICRG, 
respectively. The question that whether x variable Granger causes y variable, i.e. how much 
of the past y values explain the current y value, and if there is any improvement in 
explanation by adding variable x lagged values. It is said that x Granger caused y, if x 
contributes to predict y, or similarly when lagged x coefficients turned out to be statistically 
significant. A case which frequently occurs is a two-way causation i.e. x Granger causes y 
and y Granger causes x. However, it must be noted that the Granger cause statement does not 
indicate that y is the result of x. The Granger causality test measures information content and 
precedence, however it does not measure causality as the term says. The statistical findings 
give F-statistics obtained by performing Wald test to analyse the joint hypothesis. In the first 
hypothesis, it is tested that there is no causal relationship running from x to y, and the other 
Dependent 
Variable:𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝒅𝒅 
Model 22 Model 23 Model 24 
Gov  0.177***  0.135**  0.089** 
Pop  0.198**  0.154**  0.170** 
Inv  0.254** 0.0238** 0.243* 
Edu  0.222  0.313*  0.284* 
Corup  -0.231** -0.239** 
FAid   -0.234* 
𝑹𝑹^𝟐𝟐 0.740 0.518 0.616 
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null hypothesis states that a causal relationship runs from y to x. The value of F-statistic was 
found to be statistically significant which rejects the null hypothesis. 
 
Table 4: Granger causality test 
Equation 25 
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
RGDP 34.651 2 0.000 
L-RGDP 20.219 2 0.000 
Gov 78.236 2 0.000 
All 133.106 6 0.000 
Equation 26 
RGDP 31.721 2 0.000 
L-Gov 17.182 2 0.000 
Gov 53.236 2 0.000 
All 102.39 6 0.000 
Equation 27 
RGDP 14.613 2 0.000 
Pop 10.222 2 0.000 
L-Pop 21.236 2 0.000 
All 46.071 6 0.000 
Equation 28 
RGDP 32.231 2 0.000 
Edu 12.762 2 0.000 
L-Edu 28.236 2 0.000 
All 73.229 6 0.000 
Equation 29    
RGDP 21.651 2 0.000 
Corup 17.219 2 0.000 
L-Corup 21.236 2 0.000 
All 60.521 6 0.000 
Equation 30    
RGDP 21.023 2 0.000 
FAid 2.321 2 0.000 
L-FAid 8.091 2 0.000 
All 31.435 6 0.000 
Equation 31    
RGDP 34.231 2 0.000 
Inv 20.219 2 0.000 
L-Inv 11.226 2 0.000 
    International Journal of Innovation, Creativity and Change.  www.ijicc.net  
Volume 11, Issue 2, 2020 
 
 
 
 
 
79 
All 65.676 6 0.000 
 
Thus, another causality test was performed to check the causal relation among corruption and 
economic growth. In the first hypothesis, it is proposed a causal relation runs from corruption 
to economic growth, and in the second null hypothesis, it is proposed that no causality exists 
from economic growth to corruption. Table 3 shows that due to insignificant F-statistic, the 
first null-hypothesis cannot be rejected, which implies that it confirms that corruption does 
not cause economic growth. This finding is inconsistent with the literature. Contrarily, the F-
statistics for the second hypothesis turned out to be significant at 5% significance level, 
which indicates the rejection of the second hypothesis. The rejection of the second hypothesis 
implies that a causal relation exists between economic growth and corruption. A few 
countries while experiencing economic growth tend to make necessary structural 
adjustments, through replacing corrupt practices, policies, and institutions, with the good 
strategies to make it look less crucial, which may empower the elite class and encourage 
corrupt activities (Franko, 2018). Such as, after the Second World War, the rapid growth 
period of the former Soviet Union has aggravated the corruption level without improving 
institutions and introducing new policies. In late 1990s, the Asian crisis has shown that 
experiencing rapid economic growth in the absence of proper institutional structures may 
encourage corruption and is more exposed to crises (Chang & Grabel, 2014). 
 
Conclusion  
 
It has been argued that foreign aid encourages corruption (Belgibayeva & Plekhanov, 2019). 
In an effort to improve foreign aid accountability, although costly, it has become a common 
practice, since spending on corrupt governments has abandoned those institutions which are 
critical for the country’s economic growth and that establish corrupt elites. Thus, a causality 
test was performed to test the causal relationship between corruption and foreign aid (Abu, 
Karim, & Zaini, 2015). In the first hypothesis, it is proposed that there is no causal relation 
running from corruption to foreign aid, whereas, in the second hypothesis, it is proposed that 
there is no causal relation running from foreign aid to corruption. This has shown that we 
cannot reject both the first and second null hypotheses, as F-statistics obtained for both 
hypotheses are insignificant. It implies that corruption does not cause foreign aid and foreign 
aid also does not cause corruption. A noteworthy fact highlighted by Heywood (2015) is that 
during 1960-2005, a foreign aid of above US$450 billion has been received by Africa, despite 
the worsening condition of corruption in Africa during the past few years.  
 
Furthermore, the findings suggest that the effects of government spending on output is 
reduced by corruption. Putting it differently, corruption infuses inefficiency in the factors of 
production, such as, the corrupt officials tend to approve higher cost public projects to obtain 
personal benefits (Chayes, 2015). Incompetent and inefficient firms offer bribe payments to 
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capture government licenses and contracts to obtain benefits through the corrupt officials, by 
creating additional cost and risk to the government. The findings obtained in this study are 
found to be consistent with the findings from Kobayashi (2017), who suggested that public 
investment increases and it’s effectiveness decreases with corruption, and the findings from 
Tanzi and Davoodi (2015), which indicated that public investment increases, and 
infrastructure quality and operation maintenance decreases with the increase in political 
corruption. Moreover, results also explained that the education expenditure effects on output 
also reduces with corruption. Agostino et al. (2016) reported that negative association exists 
among corruption and, because it offers limited rent-seeking opportunities compared to what 
other items offer. In our study, the variable of education spending shows human capital. 
Thus, it is concluded that human capital productivity declines with corruption. Another study 
found empirical evidence that human capital productivity is negatively affected by 
corruption. Moreover, Agostino et al. (2016) suggested that corrupt officials put in substantial 
efforts and time to accumulate political capital, which consequently may reduce the 
productivity of democracies and governments.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    International Journal of Innovation, Creativity and Change.  www.ijicc.net  
Volume 11, Issue 2, 2020 
 
 
 
 
 
81 
REFERENCES 
 
Abu, N., Karim, A., & Zaini, M. (2015). The causal relationships among corruption, political 
instability, economic development and foreign aid: Evidence from the economic 
community of West African states. Journal of Applied Economic Sciences, 10(31), 20-
33.  
Agostino, G., Dunne, J. P., & Pieroni, L. (2016). Government spending, corruption and 
economic growth. World Development, 84, 190-205.  
Aidt, T. S. (2016). Rent seeking and the economics of corruption. Constitutional Political 
Economy, 27(2), 142-157.  
Ali, M., Khan, L., Sohail, A., & Puah, C. H. (2019). The relationship between aid and 
corruption: A case of selected asian countries. Journal of Financial Crime(just-
accepted), 00-00.  
Auerbach, J. U., & Azariadis, C. (2015). Property rights, governance, and economic 
development. Review of Development Economics, 19(2), 210-220.  
Basu, K., Basu, K., & Cordella, T. (2016). Asymmetric punishment as an instrument of 
corruption control. Journal of public economic theory, 18(6), 831-856.  
Belgibayeva, A., & Plekhanov, A. (2019). Does corruption matter for sources of foreign 
direct investment? Review of World Economics, 155(3), 487-510.  
Bertrand, O., Betschinger, M. A., & Laamanen, T. (2019). Effects of subnational regional 
corruption on growth strategies in emerging economies: Evidence from Russian 
domestic and international M&A activity. Global Strategy Journal, 9(2), 303-332.  
Bonga, W. G., Sithole, R., & Shenje, T. (2015). Export sector contribution to economic 
growth in Zimbabwe: A causality analysis. The International Journal of Business & 
Management, 3(10).  
Borja, K. (2017). Corruption indicators, foreign capital, and economic growth in developing 
countries. The Journal of Developing Areas, 51(4), 95-107.  
Chang, H.-J., & Grabel, I. (2014). Reclaiming development: an alternative economic policy 
manual: Zed Books Ltd. 
Chayes, S. (2015). Thieves of state: Why corruption threatens global security: WW Norton & 
Company. 
Cooray, A., Dzhumashev, R., & Schneider, F. (2017). How does corruption affect public 
debt? An empirical analysis. World Development, 90, 115-127.  
    International Journal of Innovation, Creativity and Change.  www.ijicc.net  
Volume 11, Issue 2, 2020 
 
 
 
 
 
82 
Crescenzi, R., Cataldo, M., & Rodríguez‐Pose, A. (2016). Government quality and the 
economic returns of transport infrastructure investment in European regions. Journal of 
Regional Science, 56(4), 555-582.  
Franko, P. (2018). The puzzle of Latin American economic development: Rowman & 
Littlefield. 
Goedhuys, M., Mohnen, P., & Taha, T. (2016). Corruption, innovation and firm growth: 
firm-level evidence from Egypt and Tunisia. Eurasian Business Review, 6(3), 299-322.  
Hakimi, A., & Hamdi, H. (2017). Does corruption limit FDI and economic growth? Evidence 
from MENA countries. International Journal of Emerging Markets, 12(3), 550-571.  
Hall, J., Levendis, J., & Scarcioffolo, A. R. (2019). The Efficient Corruption Hypothesis and 
the Dynamics between Economic Freedom, Corruption, and National Income.  
Haque, M. E., & Kneller, R. (2015). Why does public investment fail to raise economic 
growth? The role of corruption. The Manchester School, 83(6), 623-651.  
Heywood, P. M. (2015). Measuring corruption: perspectives, critiques and limits. Routledge 
Handbook of Political Corruption, 137-153.  
Huang, C.-J. (2016). Is corruption bad for economic growth? Evidence from Asia-Pacific 
countries. The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, 35, 247-256.  
Iamsiraroj, S., & Ulubaşoğlu, M. A. (2015). Foreign direct investment and economic growth: 
A real relationship or wishful thinking? Economic Modelling, 51, 200-213.  
Kim, B.-Y., & Kang, Y. (2014). Social capital and entrepreneurial activity: A pseudo-panel 
approach. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 97, 47-60.  
Kobayashi, M. (2017). Political clientelism and corruption: Neo-structuralism and 
republicanism Comparing political corruption and clientelism (pp. 21-42): Routledge. 
Kodongo, O., & Ojah, K. (2016). Does infrastructure really explain economic growth in Sub-
Saharan Africa? Review of Development Finance, 6(2), 105-125.  
Leung, P. C. (2018). State ownership and firms' growth performance: the perspective of 
institutionally shaped agency.  
Lučić, D., Radišić, M., & Dobromirov, D. (2016). Causality between corruption and the level 
of GDP. Economic research-Ekonomska istraživanja, 29(1), 360-379.  
Mankiw, N. G., Romer, D., & Weil, D. N. (1992). A contribution to the empirics of economic 
growth. The quarterly journal of economics, 107(2), 407-437.  
Matar, L. (2016). Review of the Theoretical Framework on Investment Decisions The 
Political Economy of Investment in Syria (pp. 30-47): Springer. 
    International Journal of Innovation, Creativity and Change.  www.ijicc.net  
Volume 11, Issue 2, 2020 
 
 
 
 
 
83 
Mazllami, J. (2019). The impact of human development in corruption mitigation: a 
comparative analysis between Macedonia and Albania. Economia Aziendale Online, 
10(1), 191-202.  
Mbaku, J. M. (2019). Corruption and Economic Development☆ African economic 
development (pp. 331-345): Emerald Publishing Limited. 
Ogun, O. (2018). Corruption and growth: The productivity growth nexus. The Singapore 
Economic Review, 63(05), 1227-1244.  
Pedroni, P. (1999). Critical values for cointegration tests in heterogeneous panels with 
multiple regressors. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and statistics, 61(S1), 653-670.  
Sakamoto, T. (2018). Four worlds of productivity growth: A comparative analysis of human 
capital investment policy and productivity growth outcomes. International Political 
Science Review, 39(4), 531-550.  
Shan, M., Le, Y., Chan, A. P., & Hu, Y. (2020). Principal Causes of Corruption in the Public 
Construction Sector Corruption in the Public Construction Sector (pp. 49-77): Springer. 
Tanzi, V., & Davoodi, H. (2015). Corruption, Public Investment and Growth.“1997. IMF 
Working Papers, Washington, DC.  
Ugwuanyi, U. B., & Ugwunta, O. D. (2017). fiscal policy and economic growth: An 
Examination of selected countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. International Journal of 
Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences, 7(1), 117-130.  
Van den Berg, H. (2016). Economic growth and development: World Scientific Publishing 
Company. 
Webb, I., & Martin, G. (2017). The effect of banking and insurance on the growth of capital 
and output. 
Сучок, О. (2016). The Main Ways To Combat Corruption In The World.  
 
 
